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CALIBRATED COMMITMENT: THE LEGAL 
TREATMENT OF MARRIAGE 
AND COHABITATION 
Milton C. Regan, jT.':' 
INTRODUCTION 
The rate of cohabitation without marriage has increased dramati-
cally in Western countries over the past few decades. l Moreover, re-
search suggests that cohabitation has become less of an "engagement" 
that serves as a prelude to marriage and more of an intimate arrange-
ment that may serve as an alternative to it.!! In other words, it is less 
accurate than before to describe those who cohabit as simply involved 
in a "trial" marriage.3 Many cohabitors instead regard living together 
as a way to have an intiinate relationship that mayor may not result in 
a decision to marry. This is reflected, for instance, in the declining 
* Professor of law, Georgetown University law Center. My thanks to Professor 
Donna Ruane Morrison of the Georgetown University Public Polic)' Institute, who 
guided me through the social science literature on cohabitation and who offered 
valuable comments on a draft of this Essay. 
1 See PRINCIPLES OF TIlE LAw OF F.u.ULY DISSOLUTION: ANALySIS ,\ND RECO~t.~IE.''D.\. 
TIONS § 6.03 Reporter's Notes, cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000)]; larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabi-
tation and Implications for Children:S Family Contexts in tlle United Slales, 54 POPULATIOS 
STUD. 29, 29-30 (2000); Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation in Western Europe: Trends, 
Issues and Implications 1 (Oct. 30, 2000) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 
symposium, Just Living Together: Implications of Cohabitation for Childun, Families, and 
Policy, at Pennsylvania State University (Oct. 30-31, 2000» (on file \\;th author). 
2 See, e.g., Ronald R Rindfuss & Audrey VandenHeuvel, Cohabitalicm: A PT.-alTSor 
to Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single?, 16 POPUL\TlON & DE\'. RE .... 703 passim 
(1990); Pamela J. Smock & Sanjiv Gupta, Cohabitation in Contemporary North 
America 25 (Oct. 30, 2000) (unpublished manuscript presented at the S)mposium. 
Just Living Together: Implications of Cohabitation for Childrm, Families, alld Po!iC;i. at Penn-
sylvania State University (Oct. 30-31, 2000» (on file with author). 
3 See Larry L Bumpass, Tire Changing SignificallCR of Marriage in tile Ulliled Slaies. ill 
THE CHANGING F.u.ULY IN CoMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AsIA AND THE UNITED ST,\TES 63. 
7I (Karen Oppenheim Mason et al. cds., 1998) ("There is clear c\idcnce now ••• that 
the probability of marrying following cohabitation is declining. as is the probability of 
marrying a cohabiting partner."). 
1435 
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percentage of cohabitors who eventually marry4 and in the fact that a 
portion of the declining rate of marriage is due to the increasing rate 
of cohabitation.5 In addition, the percentage of cohabitors who have 
been together for three years or more has increased,6 as well as the 
percentage of cohabiting households in which children reside.7 
These trends raise the question whether American law should 
more explicitly "institutionalize" cohabitation by ending the different 
treatment of marital and non-marital relationships, thereby making 
available to cohabitors a host of benefits currently available only to 
those who are married.8 There are signs that, to varying degrees, the 
institutionalization of cohabitation already has begun. The most com-
prehensive example is the Scandanavian countries, where cohabita-
tion arguably has come Closest to representing a widely-accepted 
alternative to marriage. The law in these countries treats cohabitation 
as virtually indistinguishable from marriage.9 Similarly, in Canada, 
the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act has eliminated fed-
erallegal distinctions between married couples and those who cohabit 
for at least a year. lO As a result, "[t]he upshot is that all conjugal un-
ions are now almost fully equivalent under Canadian federal law, the 
remaining distinction being that married people do not have to live 
together for a year for the benefits and obligations to apply to 
them."ll 
In the United States, Vermont has enacted legislation that treats 
all same-sex couples who enter into a civil union the same as those 
who are married, except for the former's inability to be formally mar-
ried.12 Less comprehensively, several municipalities and some states 
have passed domestic partner provisions that extend selected benefits 
to unmarried partners, or at least offer cohabitors the opportunity to 
register as partners for the purpose of obtaining certain privileges 
4 Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 15. 
5 Larry L. Bumpass et aI., The Role of Cohahitatian in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 
J. MAruuAGE & FA1>f. 913, 913 (1991). 
6 Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 16; see also Michael Murphy, 17ze Evolutian of 
Cohabitatian in Britain, 1960-95,54 POPULATION STUD. 43, 49-50 (2000). 
7 Bumpass & Lu, supra note 1, at 29-30; Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 16. 
8 On the concept ofinstitutionaIization, see LINDA]. WAITE, Cohabitatian: A Com-
munitarian Perspective, in MAruuAGE IN AMERICA: A COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 15-17 
(Martin King Whyte ed., 2000); Steven L. Nock, A Comparisan of Marriages and Cohab-
iting Relationships, 16]. FAM. ISSUES 53, 55-74 (1995); Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 
2l. 
9 See EJ. GRAFF, WHAT Is MAruuAGE FoR? 52 (1999). 
10 See Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 22. 
11 Id. 
12 SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp.2000). 
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from public or private entities. IS Finally, the growth in the number of 
courts that are willing to find a basis for honoring financial claims by 
partners against one another at the dissolution of the relationship re-
flects increasing willingness to provide economic remedies similar to 
those available to spouses who divorce.14 
On one view, full institutionalization is warranted because cohabi-
tation and marriage involve substantially the same attitudes and orien-
tation. The claim is that they differ only in the willingness of the 
couple to go through the formality of marriage, which is an insuffi-
cient basis for distinguishing between them. Hi From this perspective, 
cohabitation has become a more important relationship for persons 
who desire intimate commitment but reject the need for formallegaI 
recognition of this commitment. For these couples, "real" marriage is 
a frame of mind, not the possession of a marriage certificate. Such a 
view arguably harkens back to an earlier historical time, before church 
and state found it in their interest to insist upon ceremonial formali-
ties as the prerequisite for marriage. In that era, couples who lived 
together "as man and vme" were regarded as married because of their 
conduct, not because they had participated in a prescribed ritual.1G 
Some might maintain that modern cohabitors can be seen as in-
heritors of this tradition. The argument is that those who live to-
gether without marriage are just as committed as those who are 
married, but they reject the baggage that goes along with that legal 
status. Some research indicates, for instance, that those who cohabit 
have more egalitarian views on gender roles than do spouses.17 For 
such couples, eschewing marriage may be a ,vay to reject the gender 
assumptions that have been so prominent a feature of marriage as a 
social institution. 
An alternative argument for institutionalization is that respect for 
individual privacy and autonomy mandates that the state not favor any 
particular form of intimate relationship above others. If marriage is 
losing favor because it meets the needs of fewer people, then the state 
13 For an overview of such provisions, see ]ulianna S. Gonen, Sar1U:-Scx Unions and 
Domestic Partnerships, 2 GEO.]. GENDER & L. 329 (2001). 
14 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note I, § 6.03 Reporter's 
Notes, cmt. h. 
15 See GRAFF, supra note 9, at 209-15. 
16 See id. at 193-95. 
17 See Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 6 ("[C]ohabitation tends to be selective of 
people who are slightly more liberal, less religious, and more supportive of egalit .. man 
gender roles and nontraditional family roles."); see also Marin Clarkberg et at., Alii-
tudes, Values, and Entrance into Cohabitation versus Marital Unions, 74 Soc. FORCES 609, 
622-24 (1995). 
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should not try artificially to prop it up by creating incentives for part-
ners to enter into an arrangement that they othenvise would not 
choose. On this view, the rise in cohabitation reflects the fact that 
many partners now desire more individual independence, and less 
commitment, as a part of their intimate relationships. IS Rather than 
take the whole package of benefits and bur4ens that marriage pro-
vides, couples prefer to tailor the tenns of their relationships so they 
reflect their own unique preferences. Cohabitation, thus, can accom-
modate the ,vide range of ,vishes about how people want to arrange 
their personal lives better than marriage. Its growth reflects the 
greater prominence of the ideals of individual autonomy and privacy 
in intimate matters. 
Are these arguments persuasive? Should legal trends continue so 
that cohabitation and marriage ultimately receive virtually identical 
legal recognition? On balance, I think that the answer is no. First, I 
am skeptical that cohabitors are married in substance but simply not 
in fonn. Research indicates ¢.at cohabiting relationships are less sta-
ble than marriages and that they generally reflect less commitment by 
partners to one another.19 Second, law need not be agnostic among 
types of intimate relationships. There are good reasons for law to pro-
mote marriage, because there are good reasons to promote intimate 
commitment. Blurring the line between married and unmarried 
couples would undennine the ability to express this preference. 
At the same time, it seems inadvisable to proclaim a preference 
for marriage by denying cohabitors all the legal privileges available to 
spouses. Neither categorical extension nor denial of all marriage·like 
benefits to cohabiting partners is appropriate. With respect to certain 
issues, the state's desire to create incentives or express social values 
may be outweighed by more important considerations. This means 
that making decisions about the respects in which cohabitors should 
enjoy legal treatment similar to spouses requires sensitivity to the in-
terests at stake in each instance. In this Essay, I examine a variety of 
benefits and suggest some general rules of thumb about when the le-
gal claims of cohabitors should be honored as if made by spouses. 
A couple of points are worth making at the outset of my argu-
ment. First, I speak in this Essay primarily about the extension of ben-
efits to domestic partners, rather than the imposition of duties upon 
them. That is because this has been the focus of most of the debate 
about the legal treatment of married and unmarried couples. I read-
18 FRANCES K GoLDSCHNEIDER & LINDA]. WAITE, NEW FAMIUES, No FAMIUES? THI:: 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 62-63 (1991). 
19 See text accompanying infra notes 22-26. 
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ily acknowledge, however, that a fuller debate would consider not only 
when domestic partners should be given rights, but also when they 
should assume certain responsibilities. Indeed, as I will make clear, 
one reason for rejecting certain claims by unmarried couples is that 
they seek benefits comparable to those available to spouses without 
corresponding obligations to which married partners are subject.20 
Second, my focus is on the legal treatment of those who are mar-
ried and those who have the option to marry but do not do so. As I 
have argued elsewhere, I believe that marriage should be open to 
partners in same-sex relationships.21 In the absence of this right to 
marry, domestic partner legislation is a humane and pragmatic way to 
recognize the commitment of many of these couples. For this reason, 
asking how married and unmarried opposite-sex couples should be 
treated in comparison to one another raises issues different from 
those that deal with the relative treatment of opposite-sex and same-
sex couples. I concern myself in this Essay with the first question. but 
also suggest how permitting same-sex couples to marry may in fact 
strengthen, rather than weaken, the privileged position of marriage. 
I. MARruAGE, COHABrrATION, AND UNEQUAL TREATIoIE..'" 
In this Part, I argue that married and unmarried partners should 
not be accorded similar legal treatment because (1) marriage tends to 
be a more enduring relationship than cohabitation, and (2) society is 
justified in privileging marriage as a way of expressing the import. .. mce 
of intimate commitment. Furthermore, I suggest, those who invoke 
the value of private ordering to criticize preferential treatment for 
marriage overlook the fact that in certain respects those who marry 
have more latitude to arrange their relationships as they wish than 
those who cohabit. 
A. Relative Stability and Commitment 
The first reason for resisting full legal institutionalization of co-
habitation is that evidence suggests that cohabitation is less stable 
than marriage. Cohabitors break up at a higher rate than spouses di-
vorce and live together for a briefer duration than married couples.22 
Furthermore, even those cohabitors who eventually marry divorce at a 
20 See text accompanying infra notes 100-10. 
21 See Mrr.TON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY L-\.w AND THE PURSUIT OF Ir-.~MAC\' 119-22 
(1993). 
22 See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 1, at 33; Jay D. Tcachman ct aI., L£gal Sta/rts and 
the Stability ofCoresidential Unions, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 571,583 (1991); W.\!TE, supra note 
8. 
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higher rate than spouses who never lived together before marriage.2J 
Some uncertainty exists about the extent to which these differences 
reflect the fact that those who are less committed are attracted to co-
habitation, as opposed to cohabitation itself shaping attitudes about 
the desirability and feasibility of permanence and commitment in inti-
mate relationships.24 In any event, it seems inaccurate to contend that 
cohabitors . differ from spouses only in their unwillingness to clothe 
their relationship with the formal status of marriage. Rather, unmar-
ried partners generally are less committed to one another than are 
spouses.25 Furthermore, this commitment generally results in greater 
well-being for spouses than for domestic partners.26 
Advocates of the view that cohabitation and marriage are substan-
tively the same might claim that unmarried cohabitation simply repre-
sents the return of an historical social arrangement whereby a 
couple's conduct, rather than its participation in a ceremony, was I'e-
garded as constituting marriage.27 The rise of ceremonial marriage 
occurred in the mid-sixteenth century as both state and church for 
various reasons sought to exert more control over intimate relation-
ships.28 One impetus for this phenomenon was urbanization and the 
more frequent encounter with strangers.29 When couples lived their 
lives primarily in a relatively small community, their conduct alone 
sufficed to communicate that others could treat them as an economic 
and social unit. Those who needed to know individuals' marital status 
knew it, which made a formal ceremony generally unimportant. 
In the intervening five hundred years, formal marriage has taken 
on powerful symbolic significance as a public expression of partners' 
commitment to a shared intimate life with one another.30 For this 
23 See William G. Axinn & Arland Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitation 
and Divorce: Selectivity or Causal Influence?, 29 DEMOGRAPHY 357, 357-58 (1992): Lee A. 
Lillard et aL, Premarital Cohabitation and Subsequent Marital Dissolution: A Malter of Sdf 
Selection?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 437, 438 (1995). 
24 See Axinn & Thornton, supra note 23, at 358-72: Nock, supra note 8, at 54-55: 
Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 8. 
25 See Nock, supra note 8, 3,t 65-67:Judith Treas & Deirdre Giesen, Sexual Infidel-
ity Among Married and Cohabiting Americans, 62 J. MAruuAGE & FAM. 48, 59 (2000); 
WAITE, supra note 8. 
26 WAITE, supra note 8. 
< 27 See GRAFF, supra note 9, at 193-95. 
28 See id. at 195-203. 
29 See id. at 200. 
30 This ascendance of a widely accepted companionate marriage in the last cen-
tury and a half or so has been an important influence in promoting this understand-
ing. See CAIu. N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM 'rHE 
REvOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 8-25 (1980): KAREN LYSTRA, SEARCHING THE HEART: We. 
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reason, the cultural meaning of cohabitation is different than it was 
prior to the rise of ceremonial marriage. Given the current social sig-
nificance. of marriage, it is reasonable to assume that those who live 
together without marrying at least have reservations about making the 
kind of commitment that a formal ceremony would express. 
It may appear more plausible to claim that those who cohabit 
want the substantive equivalent of marriage without the traditional 
gender roles that are so closely associated with that institution. Part-
ners' relative equality of earning power, for instance, enhances the 
stability of cohabitation but reduces it for marriage.51 Nonetheless. 
both cohabiting and married couples adopt a gendered division of 
labor in which women perform more housework than men. although 
the gap is narrower for unmarried partners.52 Thus, co-residence. 
rather than formal marriage, seems to be what triggers an uneven allo-
cation of domestic responsibilities.33 
Furthermore, the last few decades have witnessed the dismantling 
of the legal system that served formally to reinforce traditional gender 
roles within marriage.34 This, of course, is not to deny that many 
spouses continue to adhere to such roles out of custom and informal 
expectations. Entry into the formal status of marriage, however, gen-
erally does not subject partners to a legal regime that promotes such 
behavior, nor does avoidance of that status ensure that the relation-
ship will be egalitarian. This 'is all the more true in light of the fact 
that more cohabiting couples are having children togetller, since the 
arrival of a child militates powerfully toward a traditional division of 
labor withiil the household.35 As a result, it seems difficult to claim 
that cohabiting couples represent committed partners who differ 
from spouses only in their departure from conventional gender roles. 
MEN, MEN, AND ROMANTIC LoVE IN NINETEENTH-CENroRY A>'IERlC:\ 192-226 (1989); 
ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT EXPEGrATIONS: MARRlACE AND DIVORCE IN POST'\'CTORL\'~ 
AMERICA 60-72 (1980). 
31 SeeJulie Brines & KaraJoyner, Tile Ties Tilat Bind: Principles o/Collesion in Co/wll-
itatian and Marriage, 64 AM. Soc. REv. 333, 350 (1999). 
32 See Sanjiv Gupta, The Effects 0/ Transitions in Marital Status on Men ~ Pt-rfonnan(e 
of Housework, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FA1>I. 700, 707 (1999); Scott]. South & Glenna SpilZC. 
HousewOTk in Marital and Nonmarital Households, 59 A>.f. Soc. lw:. 327, 327-44 (1994). 
33 See Gupta, supra note 32, at 710. 
34 See David L. Chambers, What Jf?: The ugal OJIISCqllfll({-S of Marriage antI/he ugal 
Needs oJLesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. RE\'.447, 453-54 (1996); Milton C. 
Regan,Jr., Marriage at tlle Millennium, 33 FA1>f. L.Q. 647,656 (1999). 
35 "A recent swvey found that fully two-thirds of Americans believc it would bc 
best for women to stay home and care for family and children." Jo,\.'-: WIL1.L\."IS, UN-
BENDING GENDER: WHY FA1>IILY AND WORK CoNFUGr AND WHAT TO Do AnOL'T IT 2 
(2000). 
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In sum, it appears unpersuasive to argue that full legal institution~ 
alization of cohabitation is warranted because cohabitors differ from 
spouses only in the relatively trivial respect that they have failed to 
obtain a marriage certificate. Cohabitors are not just people who are 
married in substance but not in form. They generally are less commit~ 
ted, and their relationships are less stable, than those who are mar~ 
ried. If this difference is socially important, it is reasonable for the law 
to treat couples who are married differently than those who are not. 
B. Commitment and Private Ordering 
Perhaps, however, comparable treatment of married and unmar~ 
ried couples should rest on another foundation: the claim that the 
level of partners' intimate commitment should not be a matter of state 
concern. Individuals may desire a range of different types of relation-
ships, none of which should be favored by law. Having children may 
provide greater justification for encouraging stable relationships, but 
that concern applies regardless of the marital status of the couple. On 
this view, comparable treatment of cohabiting and married couples 
expresses respect for individual autonomy and privacy in the selection 
of intimate partners. Indeed, cohabitation embodies the movement 
toward greater private ordering in intimate life, in contrast with a 
traditional status-based legal regime based on marriage. 
1. Commitment 
The first response to this claim is that society has a legitimate 
interest in promoting intimate commitment between adults, regard~ 
less of whether the relationship also involves children. I have made 
this argument at greater length elsewhere and so will only briefly reca~ 
pitulate it here.36 
I begin with a powerful fundamental value of modem liberal soci~ 
ety: individual authenticity.37 Three concepts cluster around this 
value. The first is what we might call self-fidelity: "to thine own self be 
true," in Polonius's words.3s Each of us has a unique identity and p~ 
36 See Milton C. Regan,Jr., Law, Marriage, and Intimate Commitment, 9 VA.]. Soc. 
POL'y & L. (forthcoming Fall 2001). 
37 See generaUy ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM 139-43 (1999) 
(describing the profound effect on modem Western culture of romanticism, for 
which "the greatest virtue of all" is authenticity); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS Of' 
AUTHENTICnY (1991) (analyzing the implicit moral foundations of authenticity); Ll<J.. 
NEL TRILLING, SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY (1972) (tracing the evolution in Western 
moral life from sincerity to authenticity as crucial value). 
38 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3. 
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tential that we should strive to attain.39 The second concept is auton-
omy, the idea that human beings can be self-governing. I am true to 
myself when my life is shaped by my own wishes and values rather than 
by the unreflective acceptance of others.40 
Finally, individual authenticity involves integrit)'. This requires 
that a person remain true to her principles or commitments in the 
face of temptation to do otherwise. Integrity thus involves consis-
tency. An individual needs to harmonize her values so that she can 
live life without being constantly pulled in different directions. Fur-
ther, she needs to be willing to act in accordance with those \'alues.41 
Integrity is complementary to seU:fidelity and autonomy. A person 
who tries to be true to herself values integrity, because it helps her 
resist acting in a way that does not reflect her deep sense of self. An 
autonomous person seeks to live with integrity, because it helps to har-
monize her values into principles of self-governance. 
Authenticity and the set of ideals that cluster around it require a 
sense of the continuity and stability of the self over time. SeU:fidelity 
requires a coherent self to whom one can be true. The aspiration to 
autonomy assumes a self who can establish standards to govern her 
behavior in a variety of circumstances, rather than one who is "radi-
cally situated"42 and moved only by immediate impulse. Finally, the 
harmonization of values and of beliefs and behavior that characterizes 
integrity implies a self that establishes limits on what she will do on the 
ground that some conduct is inconsistent with who she is. Without 
this stability, as Lynne Mcfall puts it, "there would be nothing to fear 
the loss of, not because we are safe but because we have nothing to 
lose."43 Self-fidelity, autonomy, and integrity thus contribute to a 
sense of individual stability and are predicated upon its existence. 
The ability to make and keep commitments is critical to the unity 
of the self over time. Commitment reflects the intention to restrict 
future possible courses of action for the sake of values that one re-
gards as especially important. It means that one is not receptive in an 
undifferentiated fashion to all possibilities available in all circum-
39 As Charles Taylor puts it, "Being true to myself means being true to my own 
originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, 
I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my O\m." TA\". 
LOR, supra note 37, at 29. 
40 For an account of the evolution of autonomy as a core "'estern concern, seeJ. 
B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INvENTION OF AurONOMY (1998). 
41 See generally Lynne McFall, Integrit)', 98 ETHICS 5, 6 (1987) (describing the im-
portance of an authentic relationship to one's chosen principles). 
42 MICHAEL]. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUST1CE 21 (1982). 
43 McFall, supra note 41, at 20. 
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stances, but is responsive to experience in terms of its significance for 
what we care about. Indeed, commitments help bestow that signifi-
cance, making possible the understanding of oneself as a unique pro-
tagonist in a coherent narrative that gives meaning to what othenvise 
would be a series of discrete random events. Commitments thus are 
what Lynne McFall calls "identity-conferring."44 As she puts it, "they 
reflect what we take to be most important and so determine, to a large 
extent, our [moral] identities."45 In this way, the foreclosure of possi-
bility that commitment represents is the precondition of agency. The 
adoption of constraints on action ironically makes possible a sense of 
individual freedom. 
Among our most profound commitments, of course, are those to 
other people. In particular, romantic intimacy, at least in Western 
contemporary society, is regarded as a relationship that engages iden-
tity in an especially deep way.46 The relationship between identity and 
intimacy is expressed by Anthony Giddens, who notes the strong hold 
of the idea of romantic love as "an odyssey, in which self-identity awaits 
its validation from the discovery of the other."47 Because of this role 
of intimacy in fostering authenticity, intimate commitment ertioys a 
privileged status among the various kinds of commitments that we 
may make. In sum, there is a powerful claim that society should pro-
mote commitment as a valuable good, because it is essential to realiza-
tion of the deeply-rooted aspiration that individuals lead lives that 
they can call their own. 
Even if we accept a role for law in promoting intimate commit-
ment, are we justified in privileging marriage as the form that such 
commitment should take? One may argue that ivhat gives meaning to 
intimate allegiances is not the assumption of a formal legal status, but 
the personal choice to commit t9 another. If that is so, then law should 
ratify the intimate choices that people make, married or unmarried, 
rather than holding up one particular form of commitment as the 
ideal. 
Choice per se does not bestow value upon alternatives, however, 
nor does it play any role in constructing an authentic identity. The 
sense that the choices one makes have significance-that they mat-
ter-depends on the existence of a social background that designates 
what is ofvalue.48 These values are diverse and sometimes incommen-
44 Id. at 13. 
45 Id. 
46 See IRVING SINGER, THE PURSUIT OF LoVE 66 (1994). 
47 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY: SEXUALllY, LOVE AND 
EROTICISM IN MODERN SOCIETIES 45 (1992). 
48 See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 37. 
HeinOnline -- 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1445 2000-2001
2001] CALIBRATED COMMITMENT 
surable. A person's choices among them have implications for her 
identity, because they reflect her own distinctive evaluation, ordering, 
and attempted reconciliation of values that she regards as having inde-
pendent value. Making difficult choices is character-forming, because 
it represents confrontation 'with the pull of obligations whose force we 
cannot control solely by ourselves. By contrast, a person for whom 
things assume value simply by virtue of her own fiat could always dis-
solve any dilemma merely by proclaiming that one of the alternatives 
no longer possesses any significance. 
For intimate commitment to be constitutive of identity thus re-
quires that it be seen as something that derives its value from a source 
outside the self's choice to engage in it. 49 It requires, in other words, 
social validation. The legal institution of marriage plays an especially 
significant role in providing such validation for the value of commit-
ment. It bestows a legal status on partners that is the basis for imper-
sonal rights and obligations. Those who marry participate in a public 
ritual that marks entry into a social institution that is intended to em-
body the value of intimate commitment That institution transcends 
any specific couple who may be a part of it and has a history that 
dwarfs any couple's particular ex-perience. Marriage is not static; un-
derstandings of the proper role of wives, for instance, have shifted 
dramatically over the past generation and are still the focus of conten-
tion.50 Nonetheless, marriage offers a reasonably coherent set of ex-
pectations and traditions about commitment that aids in the 
construction of a narrative identity both for each partner and for the 
couple together. Indeed, this role of marriage is reflected in the fact 
that many gay and lesbian critics argue that denying same-sex couples 
the right to marry is injurious, precisely because it deprives such 
couples of this social acknowledgment of the value of their intimate 
commitments. 51 
The first response to the claim that respect for private ordering of 
intimate relationships justifies legal institutionalization of cohabita-
49 See STEPHEN L. DARWAU., IMPARTIAL RE,\sON 165 (1983) ("That which endows 
our life with meaning must be something whose value we regard as self.transcen-
dent. "); see also JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, CARE AND CoMMITMENT 42-60 (1991) (discussing 
the importance of impersonal value to the significance of what we care about). 
50 See generally WIU.IAMS, supra note 35 (arguing that the models of"idcal worker" 
and "marginalized caregiver" prevent both men and women from ex-periencing work 
and family as they would like). 
51 See, e.g., BarbaraJ. Cox, But Why Not Marriage? An Essay Qn l'mncmt:S Civil Un-
ions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. RE\'. 113. 136-47 
(2000). 
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tion, therefore, is rhat society is justified in promoting commitment by 
favoring marriage. 
2. Private Ordering 
The second response is that the private ordering that cohabita-
tion involves increasingly has been eroded in several respects. For 
some purposes, cohabitation has taken on the character of a status, 
while marriage provides greater opportunity for couples to arrange 
their lives as they wish. Cohabitors who wish to make financial claims 
on their partner when their relationship ends, or to receive certain 
benefits as a family member of their partner, generally must convince 
a court that their relationship is or was the substantive equivalent of 
marriage.52 Courts, as a fonnal matter, tend to frame the inquiry in 
cases involving financial awards as whether a contract between the 
parties gave rise to the expectation of such assistance.l'3 As the ALI 
project on family dissolution has observed, however, many courts 
appear to vindicate an equitable rather than a contractual principle. 
That is, having concluded that a particular set of facts demands a 
remedy, they may stretch ordinary contract principles to fit the rem-
edy within a contractual rubric. This result is not surprising. Parties 
may share their lives for many years without having any clear agree-
ment, express or implied, that sets out the financial consequences 
that would follow from the decision by one of them to terminate 
their relationship. To find such an agreement may therefore re-
quire filling many gaps with terms that follow more from the court's 
sense of fairness than from any mutual intentions inferable from 
the parties' conduct.54 
In short, the law tends to treat cohabitation between intimate 
partners as akin to a status. That is, persons who live together in a 
relationship that involves financial and emotional interdependency 
are given rights and are subject to obligations by operation of law, 
even in the absence of explicit consent by the partners. 
• The ALI proposal suggests that the law in this area should explic-
itly acknowledge its reliance on status, so that "property claims and 
support obligations presumptively arise between persons who qualify 
as domestic partners, as they do between legal spouses .... "55 The 
detennination whether an unmarried couple is a domestic partner-
ship depends on whether the couple "for a significant period of time 
52 See infra text accompanying notes 62-68. 
53 See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112-13 (Cal. 1976). 
54 ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. h. 
55 Id. 
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share[d] a primary residence and a life together as a couple."56 
Whether they are deemed to have shared a life together must be de-
termined "by reference to all the circumstances,"j7 which includes 
consideration of thirteen different factors.!iS 
Conceptualizing cohabitation as a status reflects two ways in 
which private ordering has become circumscribed for nonmarital 
partners. First, an individual cannot avoid a financial obligation to his 
or her partner simply by avoiding marriage. The presumption is that 
domestic partners have aSsumed certain responsibilities toward one 
another, which will be imposed unless ex-plicitly disavowed. By con-
trast, at the time Marvin v .. Marvirf>9 was decided, the presumption was 
that unmarried partners had no obligations toward one another, un-
less they had affirmatively embraced them. 60 Only spouses were as-
sumed to have agreed to financial sharing.61 The default rule for 
cohabitors, in other words, now tends to mirror the rule that governs 
spouses. As a result, the absence of formal legal status does not neCes-
sarily mean the absence of de facto status. 
Second, in order to bring a claim successfully, a partner must es-
tablish that the cohabitation was the substantive equivalent of mar-
riage. This requires that unmarried couples conform to conventional 
cultural norms about appropriate marital behavior. Thus, for in-
stance, factors that the ALI regards as relevant in determining 
whether individuals "shared a life together as a couple" include con-
siderations such as "the extent to which the parties intermingled their 
finances,"62 "[t]he extent to which their relationship fostered the par-
ties' economic interdependence, or the economic dependence of one 
party upon the other,"63 "[t]he extent to which the parties engaged in 
conduct and assumed specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance 
of their life together,"64 and "[t]he emotional or physical intimacy of 
the parties' relationship. "65 
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals, in Braschi v. StahlA.ssod-
ates CO.,66 concluded that a same-sex partner should be considered a 
56 [d. § 6.03(1). 
57 [d. § 6.03(7). 
58 [d. § 6.03(7) (a)-(ro). 
59 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
60 [d. at 116. 
61 See id. at 118. 
62 ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note I, § 6.03(7)(b). 
63 [d. § 6.03(7) (c). 
64 [d. § 6.03(7)(d). 
65 [d. § 6.03(7) (h). 
66 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
HeinOnline -- 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1448 2000-2001
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 
"family member" of the deceased and therefore entitled to remain in 
the latter's rent-controIled apartment, because the couple lived in a 
household "having all of the normal familial characteristics."67 In 
general, the court said, such characteristics include "the exclusivity 
and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial 
commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their 
everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance 
placed upon one another for daily family services."68 
By contrast, those who are married may organize their lives as 
they vvish and still automatically receive the benefits (and incur the 
obligations) associated with that status. A husband can, for instance, 
work in another city during the week and reside with his wife only on 
the weekends and still be treated as a spouse. A married couple may 
maintain strictly separate financial accounts, or not practice sexual ex~ 
c1usivity, and will still be regarded as married for legal purposes. Un~ 
married cohabitors, therefore, generally must live consistently with 
main~tream understandings of appropriate marital behavior in order 
to receive certain legal benefits. By contrast, those who formally as~ 
sume marital status have the freedom to arrange their intimate lives as 
they wish without fear of jeopardizing the benefits flowing from 
marriage. 
Married parents enjoy similar latitude in their enjoyment of pa-
rental benefits. An unmarried biological father seeking custody of or 
visitation with a child, for instance, or a voice in the decision to place 
the child with an adoptive family, must demonstrate that he has con-
sistently maintained a meaningful relationship with the child in order 
to assert any legal right that attaches to parenthood.69 A father mar~ 
ried to his child's mother, however, is automatically entitled at divorce 
to consideration for custody and visitation rights, and his consent 
must be obtained prior to the adoption of the child.70 This is so re~ 
gardless of whether he has had meaningful involvement in his child's 
life (unless his lack of involvement is so egregious that he is deemed 
to' have abandoned the child).71 
Law, therefore, should be free to favor marriage over cohabita-
tion and should not blur the distinction between the two kinds of rela-
tionships. Does that mean that unmarried couples should receive 
none of the benefits available to spouses? Should the desire to avoid 
67 fa. at 54. 
68 fa. at 55 (citations omitted). 
69 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983). 
70 MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMIUES AND THE LAw 163-64 (1994). 
71 See, e.g., Ex parte C.V., No. 1981316, 2000 WL 1717011 (Ala. Nov. 17, 2000). 
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eroding allegiance to marriage lead to rejection of any claims by un-
married partners that are not based on ex-plicit contractual 
agreement? 
II. QUALIFIED RECOGNITION 
Categorical denial of claims by domestic partners seems no less 
problematic than eliminating the distinction between married and un-
married couples. There may be reasons for recognizing claims by un-
married partners that on balance are weightier than the fear that 
doing so may lessen the distinctive status of marriage. We need to 
think carefully about the rationales for the extension or denial of 
comparable legal treatment of cohabitation and marriage, focusing 
on both the practical and symbolic significance of such treatment in 
particular situations.72 
Before addressing some of the specific benefits that should be 
subject to this analysis, we need to think about what criteria should 
guide our deliberation. I propose the following. In general, we 
should acknowledge claims when failing to do so risks leaving one 
partner in an interdependent relationship seriously vulnerable or dis-
advantaged because of her reliance on the other, particularly when 
the relationship has ended. We also should recognize legal rights 
when the party. seeking those rights 'wishes to use them to assume re-
sponsibility for the care of his or her partner.. In addition, we should 
extend legal protection to children who othenvise might be injured by 
the law's denial of parental rights and benefits based on the absence 
of marital status. At the same time, we reasonably may prefer married 
couples over unmarried ones with respect to matters such as adoption 
and foster care. This is justified because of the greater stability of mar-
ried as opposed to unmarried couples and the absence of a partner's 
preexisting relationship 'with a child. 
Furthennore, we generally should be skeptical about comparable 
legal treatment of married and unmarried couples wh.en denial of 
benefits to the latter would not impose hardship on a partner who has 
become vulnerable by virtue of her reliance on the relationship. In 
some cases, for instance, unmarried partners seek to be treated as 
spouses, because this would provide them with benefits on more ad-
vantageous terms than othenvise are available. The fact that they are 
unwilling to assume the responsibilities and burdens that are imposed 
on couples who marry, however, weighs against recognizing their 
claims. This is because these couples represent less than the full com-
72 My discussion in this Pan focuses on many of the legal benefits described in 
Chambers, supra note 34, at 452-85, and Bakr v. Stale, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999). 
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mitmeIl-t, for better or worse, that marriage is meant to involve. Fi .. 
nally, we may want to reject claims by unmarried partners when 
extension of a right currently reserved to spouses would leave uncer-
tainty about who is entitled to the right and would create potential for 
its abuse. 
These are broad guidelines, which serve only as provisional rules 
of thumb. They underscore, however, that, ceteris paribus, law should 
be most willing to extend legal recognition of or protection for cohab-
itation when doing so reinforces an ethic of care and commitment in 
intimate relationships. What are the implications of this approach for 
specific issues relating to the legal treatment of cohabitation? The 
discussion that follows offers some answers to this question. My inten-
tion is not to offer a definitive resolution of these issues, but to suggest 
how we might go about identifying and weighing the considerations 
that are relevant with respect to particular claims by domestic 
partners. 
A. Inter Se Claims 
Consider the first category of cases, which involves claims by one 
partner against another. The most significant of these deals with the 
allocation of property and financial support between the partners. If 
a claimant can establish that the relationship involved financial and 
emotional interdependence, the law should recognize that the vulner-
ability and reliance that necessarily result in such cases militate toward 
recognition of the claim. As a practical matter, given the substantial 
number of persons who cohabit at one time or another, refusal to 
recognize a cause of action could inflict significant hardship upon a 
considerable number of people. Many of them are likely to be wo-
men, because they are the ones in unmarried relationships who tend 
to make more financial sacrifices and are less able to convince their 
partners to marry.73 As a symbolic matter, declining to recognize 
claims would send the message that by refusing to marry one can es-
cape the responsibilities that flow from intimate relationships. While I 
have acknowledged that it is legitimate for law to take into account the 
legal form of a relationship in assigning rights and benefits, denying 
financial claims between unmarried partners would elevate form over 
substance to an unacceptable degree. 
Related to that point, the ALI is right to suggest that the basis for 
recovery in these instances should be the fact that persons have lived 
together as domestic partners, rather than express or even implicit 
73 See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Pmpectivl', 
28 UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1163, 1168-69 (1981). 
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contract theory.74 The important consideration is that individuals 
may have responsibilities of care toward one another that arise not 
simply from consent but by virtue of a shared life. whatever legal form 
it takes. Even if relying on contract doctrine may produce a similar 
result in most cases, the rhetoric of that doctrine is resolutely individu-
alist rather than relational. By contrast, to base recovery on what the 
ALI calls a "status classification"75 reflects "the familiar principle that 
legal rights and obligations may arise from the conduct of parties , .. ith 
respect to one another, even though they have created no formal doc-
ument or agreement setting forth such an undertaking. "76 
Another instance requiring us to decide whether law should 
honor the claim of one unmarried partner against the other arises 
when one of the partners dies. When a spouse dies without prO\iding 
in his will for any inheritance for his spouse. most states authorize the 
surviving spouse to claim a "forced" share of the estate. ranging from 
one-third to one-half.77 No such provision benefits a similarly situated 
surviving unmarried partner. Should it? Answering this question is a 
bit more complicated than addressing the issue of financial awards 
upon dissolution of the relationship. On the one hand, if the part-
ners had a common financial and emotional life together, the survivor 
likely would expect to share some or all of the estate in case of the 
other person's death. Indeed, she may well have made sacrifices that 
enhanced the value of that estate. As I have suggested, if the couple 
separated by choice, she should be entitled to an equitable share of 
the available assets. Why should it be any different if they separate by 
death? ' 
On the other hand, unlike the case of ordinary separation, the 
deceased partner has not attempted to withhold benefits from his 
partner for the purpose of maximizing his own wealth. He has instead 
established certain priorities among those persons with whom he feels 
some emotional bond. The exclusion of his partner from the ,\ill sug-
gests that the relationship perhaps was not as emotionally significant 
as the claimant may eventually suggest. There is more reason to re-
gard this exclusion as a genuine expression of the relative importance 
of the relationship to the deceased than to give credence to how a 
relationship is described by a partner who is seeking to minimize his 
duties at the time a couple separates. Furthermore, the other partner 
may be on notice of his choice, which means that she could not rea-
74 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note I, § 6.03 emt. b. 
75 fa. 
76 fd. § 6.02 cmt. a. 
77 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 479. 
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sonably expect to share in the estate in the event of death. If she is 
not aware of the choice, that itself may be a telling commentary on 
the nature of the relationship. 
Arguments based on the need to vindicate an ethic of care arising 
from interdependence thus seem less compelling in this case than 
'with respect to financial awards upon dissolution. The most persua-
sive rationale for extending the benefit to an unmarried partner is the 
avoidance of undue financial hardship. This suggests, perhaps, that a 
qualified domestic partner be entitled to a forced share only upon a 
showing that failure to honor the claim would impose undue hard-
ship. Thus, the standard would be similar to that required under the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act for declining to enforce the terms 
of a premarital contract that modify or eliminate spousal support.78 
How should we respond when the question is whether an unmar-
ried partner should be given any share of the estate by statute when 
her partner dies without a wil1?79 In this case, we obviously have no 
indication by the deceased that he did not wish to prevent his partner 
from being able to inherit from him. The mere failure to prepare a 
will, by itself, does not necessarily give rise to such an inference, since 
it is not uncommon for people to put off the preparation of a will. An 
important purpose of an intestacy statute is to reflect the deceased's 
likely wishes regarding the disposition of his or her estate, based on 
assumptions about the relative importance of various relationships in 
his or her life. If a person can establish that she was a domestic part-
ner, it seeI?s reasonable to assume that the deceased would have given 
her preference in his will had he made his wishes explicit. 
A countervailing consideration is that an intestacy statute also ex-
presses society's views about the value of various relationships and 
that, as I have suggested, there is reason to give priority to marriage 
among intimate relationships. If two persons who are romantic com-
panions choose not to marry, one may argue that if they want to in-
herit from each other, they should make their wishes explicit in a will. 
In addition, one could anticipate that opening the door to claims by 
unmarried partners might generate numerous disputes among those 
asserting entitlement to a portion of the estate. The arguments sur-
rounding this issue make resolving it more difficult than when a part-
ner has deliberately chosen to exclude the other partner from her 
will. On balance, it seems fairer to recognize that many people fail to 
make or to change a will and that a domestic partner who has shared a 
78 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987). 
79 For a description of benefits made available to spouses in such circumstances, 
see Chambers, supra note 34, at 455-56. 
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life with the deceased should not be penalized for her companion's 
failure. 
B. Assuming Responsibility 
A second category of cases are those in which one member of an 
unmarried couple seeks the opportunity to assume responsibility for 
decisions relating to care of the other. Laws designate, for instance, 
. those who are authorized to make medical decisions for someone 
when she becomes incompetent and who may make decisions in that 
situation with respect to matters such as choice of residence and fi-
nancial transactions.80 If a party has not indicated who should exer-
cise authority in these cases, statutes typically look first to a spouse and 
then to blood relatives to take on this role.Sl If a domestic partner is 
willing to accept responsibility for making such decisions, the author-
ity to do so is not so much a benefit that an unmarried companion 
seeks to obtain as it is a burden that she is willing to bear. Permitting 
her to do so would acknowledge the importance of care and commit-
ment in intimate relationships, which is the value that underlies a gen-
eral preference for marriage. 
Furthermore, as David Chambers has observed, the rationale for 
vesting decisionmaking power in a spouse is that this individual is 
"more likely than any other person to know what decisions the incom-
petent person would have made if she were now able to decide for 
herself or, alternatively, at least to be the person most concerned 
about the incompetent person's welfare."82 That is, a major concern 
in these cases is accuracy: the decisions made should most closely ap-
proximate those the incompetent person would make based on famili-
arity with her values and wishes. For these reasons, it seems 
appropriate to leave open the possibility that a person who establishes 
that she is a domestic partner of the incompetent person will be able 
to make decisions on his behalf. 
A related issue is the ability to take leave to care for an ill partner 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act. 83 The Act requires that cer-
tain employers grant unpaid leave for up to twelve work weeks a year 
to employees to care for a spouse, parent, or child with a "serious 
health condition. "84 It provides for no leave, however, to care for an 
unmarried partner. Should it? As with the desire to assume decision-
80 See UNIF. PROBATE CoDE §§ 5-305 (c) , 5-409 (a) , 8 U.LA 466, 487-88 (1983). 
81 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 455. 
82 [d. at 456. 
83 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994). 
84 Id. §§ 2611-2654, 2612(a)(1)(c) (1994). 
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making responsibility for an incompetent partner, there is a good ar~ 
gument that seeking to obtain this benefit reflects a willingness to take 
on the burdens that flow from intimate commitment to another per~ 
son. This willingness, along with the likelihood that the ill person may 
have no caregiver more attentive and faithful than her domestic part~ 
ner, militates in favor of amending the Act to include the provision of 
care for an unmarried partner as a basis for leave. 
C. Children 
A third category of cases in which the issue of comparable treat~ 
ment of married and unmarried persons arises deals with relation-
ships in which there are children. A person married to someone with 
a child not from the marriage is regarded by the law as a stepparent. 
He does not have the full panoply of parental rights unless he adopts 
the child,85 but in some cases stepparent status is the basis for benefits 
flowing to him or to the child. The Family and Medical Leave Act, for 
instance, pennits a worker to take leave to care for a stepchild.86 
Should it enable an unmarried partner to take leave to care for the 
child of a companion? There is a good argument that if the adult is 
willing to assume the responsibility for providing such care, the law 
should encourage this by enabling him or her to take leave under the 
Act for this purpose. Another example of parental rights and respon-
sibilities flowing from marriage involves the use of reproductive tech-
nology. When a husband consents to the insemination of his wife, 
that consent alone is sufficient for the law to treat him as the resulting 
child's father, even though he has no biological relationship to it.s7 
By contrast, an unmarried male who consents to his partner's insemi-
nation in these circumstances does not thereby attain this status.S8 
His consent, however, reflects a willingness not only to receive the 
benefits of legal parenthood, but also to assume its significant respon-
sibilities and burdens. Granting rights and imposing obligations in 
this setting would acknowledge the importance of this attitude in pro-
moting the welfare of children. 
In other instances, directly promoting the welfare of the child 
seems a good reason for according comparable treatment to married 
and unmarried partners. State workers compensation and federal So-
cial Security survivors benefit law, for instance, provide that a minor 
85 See generally MAHONEY, supra note 70, at 161 ("The process of adoption creates 
the full parent-child status between the adopting stepparent and the stepchild."). 
86 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(12), 2612(a)-(d) (1994). 
87 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998). 
88 See Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 55 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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stepchild living with and dependent upon a stepparent is eligible to 
receive benefits to replace lost income resulting from the stepparent's 
death.89 The child's eligibility, in other words, depends upon the rela-
tionship between the adults. If, however, a child must establish actual 
prior economic dependency upon an adult resident of the household 
in order to receive benefits, there seems no reason to permit recovery 
if the child is dependent upon an adult married to her parent but to 
deny it if the adult is not. Even if we consider it appropriate to ex-
press society's preference for marriage through different treatment of 
married and unmarried couples, we should not compromise chil-
dren's welfare as the price for doing so in this situation. If an adult 
partner has assumed the responsibility of helping support a child and 
the child has relied on that support, the vulnerability that results from 
the adult's death supports recognizing a child's claim for benefits to 
replace the lost income. 
Similarly, if an unmarried partner has developed an attachment 
to and relationship with a child living in the household, it genernlly is 
in the child's interest that this partner be eligible to maintain that 
relationship through visitation with the child if the adults separate. 
Yet, in many states, a cohabitor has no standing to present such a 
claim.90 The traditional rule has been that any person not a biological 
or legal parent of a child could not intervene in custody or ,isitation 
matters at divorce without a showing that the parent was unfit. 91 This 
approach disadvantages both married partners-that is, stepparents-
and cohabitors. 
In recent years, several states have explicitly authorized steppar-
ents to present claims in custody and visitation proceedings at the 
time of divorce.92 It is far less common, however, for unmarried part-
ners to have standing to do so when the adults' relationship ends. If, 
however, the partner has a significant relationship with the child, it 
seems unreasonable to base his ability to pursue continued contact 
with the child on whether he has been married to the child's mother. 
The ALI rejects reliance on marital status as the basis for deter-
mining standing in these situations. Section 2.04 of its Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissqlution provides for notice and right of participation 
in custodial responsibility proceedings for both a legal parent and a 
"de facto parent. "93 The latter is defined as someone who for a signifi-
89 Chambers, supra note 34, at 464. 
90 See MAHONEY, supra note 70, at 129-37. 
91 See, e.g., Petersen v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901, 905-06 (N.C. 1994). 
92 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note I, § 2.0·1 Reporter's 
Notes, cmt. d (discussing cases under this principle). 
93 Id. § 2.04(l)(c). 
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cant period has resided with the child and, with the legal parent's 
consent, has performed at least as much of the caretaking functions 
for the child as has the legal parent.94 The relative weight that a legal 
and a de facto parent's interest should receive is subject to some disa-
greement and warrants more elaborate discussion than I can provide 
here. The important point for my purposes is that, however the bal-
ance is struck, it seems inappropriate that only stepparents are eligible 
for de facto parent status and that everyone else is categorically ex-
cluded. The interest of the child in continuing the relationship with 
the de facto parent should at least be taken into account, whatever the 
de facto parent's relationship with the legal parent. An unmarried 
cohabitor who is willing to sustain that relationship and the responsi-
bilities that it entails should receive a hearing when he and his partner 
agree to separate. 
There are other issues dealing with children, however, where it is 
reasonable to distinguish between married and unmarried partners. 
Stepparents in most states are able to adopt a child of their spouse 
without home visits and family studies that typically are required 
before an adoption is approved.95 On one hand, the willingness of a 
cohabitor to adopt reflects a commendable desire to provide the care 
and to take on the considerable obligations that accompany legal 
parenthood. On the other hand, however, there is a higher likeli-
hood that a cohabiting couple will separate than there is that a mar-
ried couple wm divorce.96 This warrants a closer look at the 
household before a partner is permitted to adopt. Bestowing adoptive 
parenthood on an unmarried partner could make any dissolution pro-
cess more contentious, because each partner would have comparable 
rights in a custody and visitation proceeding. By contrast, even if a 
cohabitor is able to assert de facto parent status, the legal parent still is 
given certain preferences that simplify the determination of custodial 
rights and responsibilities.97 In general, this should produce more 
predictability and less conflict, which is in the interest of children. 
Such a consideration is of particular concern for children in house-
holds with unmarried partners because of the greater risk of disrup-
tion than exists for children in marital households. The home visit 
and family study ultimately may preclude few cohabitors from adopt-
ing, but it a££:ords an opportunity to make a more detailed assessment 
94 Id. § 2.03(1) (c). 
95 SeeJoan H. Hollinger, Introduction to ADOPTION LAw AND PRACfICE § 1.05[2] Ea] 
Uoan H. Hollinger ed., 1988). 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
97 For instance, a nonparent typically can obtain custody of a child only if the 
natural or legal parent is deemed unfit. See MAHONEY, supra note 70, at 140-41." 
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of the likely stability of the setting in which the partners plan to raise 
the child. 
The greater stability of married couples provides even greater jus-
tification for favoring them in adoption and foster care selections.93 
In these instances, there is no pre-existing relationship between part-
ner and child that needs to be taken into account. Here again. the 
desire of an unmarried couple to assume responsibility for a child 
through adoption or serving as foster parents is laudable. and such 
couples will still have opportunities to do so. 'When a suitable married 
couple is also available, however. the willingness of the spouses to 
make a public commitment to one another and the comparative data 
on stability99 militate toward favoring the married over the unmarried 
couple. 
D. SPecial Benefits 
Distinguishing between spouses and cohabitors also seems appro-
priate in cases in which cohabitors seek treatment as a married couple 
simply to obtain benefits othenvise unavailable or on more advanta-
geous terms. In such instances, partners seek the benefits of marital 
status without its corresponding obligations. There are a variety of 
burdens to which married couples are subject, but unmarried ones 
generally are not. If spouses apply for certain government benefits. 
such as Supplemental Security Income or welfare, the grant is lower 
than if each partner had applied separately.IOO In many cases. if only 
one spouse applies for a needs-based benefit, the income of the other 
is attributed to him or her.10l A spouse has the legal duty to pay for 
necessaries, such as emergency medical care, provided to her partner 
by third parties,102 but a cohabitor does not. In most community 
property states, a creditor can collect a debt from a married couple's 
community property, without regard to the contribution of that 
spouse to acquisition of the property.103 In addition, spouses are sub-
ject to anti-nepotism provisions, while cohabitors generally are not. I1H 
Married couples must comply with divorce law in order to end their 
relationship, but unmarried couples may separate on their own. In 
these and other 'ways, marriage involves obligations that cohabitation 
98 On such a preference, see Chambers, supra note 34, at 469-70, and dt .. ltions 
therein. 
99 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26. 
100 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 473-74 (dting 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1991». 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 484-85. 
103 See id. at 485. 
104 See id. at 460. 
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does not. For that reason, in the absence of other countervailing con-
siderations, unmarried partners should not necessarily be accorded 
the advantages of marriage. 
Thus, for instance, a gift from one spouse to another is exempt 
from the federal gift tax.105 Cohabitors could obtain this benefit 
through marriage, but have declined to do so. The law should take 
them at their word that they do not wish to enter into the kind of 
formal public commitment that marriage entails and should be able 
to deny them this benefit of making such a commitment. It is unlikely 
that unmarried partners have arranged their lives in expectation of 
such a benefit and that either would be significantly disadvantaged 
because of reliance on its anticipated availability. 
Similarly, public and private employers make health care benefits 
available to spouses of employees,106 and a few states now require cer-
tain employers to extend health insurance to the othenvise uninsured 
spouses of employees.I07 These spousal benefits are exempt from tax-
ation. IOS Cohabitors asserting a claim to such benefits seek to invoke 
their relationship as a source of individual advantage, while using 
their unmarried status to avoid the burdens of marriage. Admittedly, 
a valid consideration in these instances is the importance of ,vide-
spread availability of health insurance. In many cases, however, the 
issue is not the absolute availability of health insurance, but the ability 
to obtain it on more advantageous terms. Furthermore, it may well be 
appropriate in providing health insurance to shift emphasis away from 
membership in an intimate relationship to access to insurance on an 
individual basis. Reform efforts should focus directly on this change, 
however, rather than on the comparable treatment of individuals in 
relationships that generally feature different levels of commitment. 
Additional policy considerations are relevant in deciding whether 
to extend benefits to both married and unmarried couples in other 
cases. For instance, a foreign national who marries an American citi-
zen has a presumptive right to enter the United States immediately as 
a long-term resident. 109 Should one who cohabits ,vith an American 
citizen be entitled to the same treatment? Concerns about the integ-
rity of immigration law add weight to the refusal to do so. Even under 
existing law, there is potential for abuse of this provision through a 
"sham" marriage into which parties enter solely for the purpose of 
105 See I.R.C. §§ 1041, 2523 (1994). 
106 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 474. 
107 Id. at 484 (citing HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 87-4, 393-7, 393-21 (1993». 
108 Id. at 474 (citing I.R.C. §§ 105, 213 (1996». 
109 See 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE § 36.02 (rev. 
ed. 2000). 
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obtaining favorable immigration status. Such marriages will not be 
recognized as sufficient to trigger long-term resident status. The Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) is authorized to deter-
mine whether parties have entered into marriage in good faith. as 
opposed to doing so in order to obtain an immigration benefit.no 
This task admittedly is difficult and perhaps even controversial in 
some cases. When there is no formal marriage. it is even more vexing 
and problematic. If a partner could obtain a benefit without assum-
ing the obligations of marriage. the INS likely would receive many 
more applications than it does now. The agency would have to scruti-
nize every relationship intensively and pass judgment on whether the 
partners possessed sufficient commitment to one another to justify 
favorable immigration treatment. This would create the prospect of 
inconsistent" and unpredictable outcomes that could well undermine 
the perceived fairness and integrity. of the immigration laws. 
A similar concern arises in deciding whether cohabitors should 
be able to invoke the privilege for confidential communications that is 
now available to spouses in civil and criminal proceedings. The pri\i-
lege protects from disclosure any communication during marriage be-
tween the parties that they intended to remain confidential. even after 
the marriage is over.Ill On the one hand. respect for intimate rela-
tionships suggests that the state should not attempt to force disclosure 
of such communications in a legal proceeding. Intrusion on the pri-
vacy of committed, unmarried partners may be just as damaging as 
infringement on the privacy of spouses. This suggests that the under-
lying substance of the relationship. rather than its form. should be the 
basis for protection. 
Given the possibility that this privilege might reduce the prospect 
of civil or criminal liability. however, the number of cohabitors who 
would attempt to invoke it could be substantial. This would be prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, the court would have to conduct an in-
depth inquiry into every unmarried relationship that is asserted as the 
basis for the privilege. As with a case-by-case inquiry by immigration 
officials, this would increase the probability of contradictory and un-
predictable decisions. The ramifications of this may be especially seri-
ous, because inconsistent exclusion of evidence could erode 
confidence in the ability of the legal system to arrive at just decisions. 
A second, and related, point is that evidentiary privileges are in-
tended to be a narrow exception to the rule that a tribunal should 
110 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e}(3) (Supp. V 1999). 
111 See Milton C. Regan,Jr., Spousal Prit1ilcge and tJle Meanings of Mtmiag~ 81 V,\. 1.. 
REv. 2045, 2055-56 (1995). 
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have access to all relevant information. Making the communications 
privilege available to unmarried partners would significantly expand 
the body of evidence that potentially could be withheld from the legal 
system. An individual would be able not only to invoke the privilege 
with respect to the relationship in which he or she is currently in-
volved, but also to shield communications that occurred during ear-
lier relationships as well. The relevant figure for estimating the 
potential impact of extending the privilege to cohabitors thus would 
not be simply the percentage of the population cohabiting at a partic-
ular time, but the percentage who have ever cohabited. For these rea-
sons, it seems inadvisable to extend the privilege to unmarried 
partners. 
Another right currently available to spouses, but not cohabitors, 
is the ability to sue for loss of consortium in the event of a negligent 
injury to one's partner. This tort is meant to provide compensation 
for "loss of conjugal society, comfort, affection, companionship and 
sexual relatlons."112 A partner in an unmarried, committed relation-
ship obviously can suffer such loss just as much as a marital partner. 
Furthermore, unlike the other benefits I have discussed, such as tax 
exemption, health insurance, immigration status, and evidentiary priv-
ilege, an unmarried partner attempting to assert this cause of action 
does not have the option at the time she seeks the benefit of obtaining 
it simply by marrying. Finally, just as I have suggested that financial 
reliance by a cohabitor justifies receipt of benefits in certain cases, so 
one might argue that emotional reliance supports the right to assert a 
claim for the loss of companionship by an unmarried partner. Law, in 
other words, should try to limit the vulnerability that arises from inti-
mate interdependence. 
On the other hand, an important concern of tort law is to estab-
lish reasonable limits on the persons to whom a negligent defendant 
owes a duty. As a result, "[t]he need to draw a bright line in this area 
of the law is essential,"1l3 lest persons be subject to liability to an ex-
pansive group of claimants who are not entirely foreseeable. Marriage 
obviously provides such a bright line. The proportion of people who 
are married at any given time is considerably higher than those who 
cohabit, which makes it relatively foreseeable that one who injures an 
adult will also cause injury to the victim's spouse. In addition, the 
possibility of obtaining substantial damages could substantially in-
crease the number of claims. This, of course, would require more 
frequent case-by-case analysis of the emotional significance and dura-
112 Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582,588 (Cal. 1988). 
113 fd. 
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bility of intimate non-marital relationships. Finally, one might con-
tend that preserving this cause of action for spouses directly expresses 
the message that marriage is a distinctive relationship that ideally in-
volves the highest degree of commitment. 
The arguments on each side of this issue are strong ones, which 
makes its resolution especially difficult. One way to give some weight 
to each may be to preserve a loss of consortium claim for spouses, but 
to permit an unmarried partner who witnesses injury to his or her 
companion to bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. This would be consistent with the expansion in recent years 
of the class of persons authorized to bring a lawsuit. New Jersey, for 
instance, has recognized a cause of action for distress for an engaged 
partner who was present at the death of her fiance. 114 This "by-
stander" liability is narrower than liability for the loss of consortium, 
since the claimant must witness the injury in question.ll!i By contrast, 
a spouse who sues for loss of consortium is presumed to have suffered 
injury simply by virtue of the fact that her marital partner has been 
injured or killed, regardless of whether she was present at the 
event.ll6 Viewed from the legal fiction of foreseeability, it is reasona-
bly foreseeable that a defendant who injures someone who is with a 
companion will also cause emotional distress to that companion. par-
ticularly given the growing ranks of cohabiting partners. It is far more 
foreseeable, however, that someone who injures an unaccompanied 
person will also inflict uyury on an absent spouse than on an absent 
unmarried partner. 
III. DOMESTIC PARTNER REGISTRATION 
I have suggested with respect to some benefits that the difficulty 
and unpredictability of case-by-case identification of eligible domestic 
partners is one factor that militates against e.xtension of spousal bene-
fits to cohabitors. One way to avoid this problem would be to permit 
unmarried couples to register as domestic partners if they "ished to 
be treated comparably to spouses for certain purposes. Some jurisdic-
tions make certain public benefits available to couples who register.117 
Others furnish registration only as a step that may qualify partners for 
some private benefits, such as coverage under private employer health 
insurance policies. I IS 
114 Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372,380 (NJ. 1994). 
115 See id. 
116 See Conen, supra note 13, at 341. 
117 Ill. 
118 See id. 
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Treating registration as a device simply to obtain rights and bene~ 
fits, without any corresponding responsibilities, is at odds with the 
idea that domestic partners warrant some degree of special treatment, 
because they are committed to one another. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that at least some persons would register who would not deserve 
such favorable treatment, since registering would have no disadvan-
tages, because it triggers no oblig'ltions. 
One way to address this concern would be to provide that domes-
tic partners who register would receive some, but not all, of the bene-
fits of marriage and would be subject to some, but not all, of the 
responsibilities that spouses assume. Couples who desire a more lim~ 
ited commitment than marriage would be able to take advantage of 
this alternative. Registration would reflect a more explicit willingness 
to assume the status of cohabitor, in contrast to courts' current ten-
dency to infer such an agreement from the conduct of the parties.1H1 
One might argue that this system would take account of couples' vary-
ing degrees of commitment and would provide a more predictable 
legal regime governing intimate relationships than we now have. 
Rather than maintaining a dichotomy between married and unmar-
ried couples, law would offer a menu of choices that gives partners 
greater choice over the terms of their relationships. 
There are, however, at least a couple of concerns about this ar-
rangement. First, it would effectively revive explicit contract as the 
basis for the rights and duties of cohabitors. While registration does 
not carry some of the negative connotations that contract does in the 
context of intimate relationships, partners who register nonetheless 
would be entering into an agreement that provided for enforceable 
rights and duties with respect to one another and third parties. Yet, as 
the ALI has observed, even as courts formally invoke the doctrine of 
contract, in substance they tend to rely on general equitable princi-
ples in adjudicating claims between unmarried partners.120 Such flex-
ibility is valuable in light of the fact that not all forms of vulnerability 
and reliance can be explicitly anticipated in advance. Responsibilities 
and expectations can arise from interdependence, not simply from 
voluntary agreement, and will vary according to the course of a rela-
tionship whose trajectory necessarily will be uncertain. If domestic 
partners must register in order to ellioy any rights or obligations, 
many deserving individuals will be left without recourse. If some 
claims will be recognized even in the absence of registration, then a 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 52-71. 
120 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. b. 
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registration scheme will provide little more predictability than cur-
rently exists. 
A second concern is more subtle, but not necessarily less impor-
tant. Would law still be recognizing and encouraging commitment if 
partners could calibrate in advance the specific benefits they e~ .. pect to 
enjoy and the particular burdens they are willing to accept? In what 
sense would it be meaningful to speak. of commitment that involves, 
for instance, willingness to be responsible for emergency medical ex-
penses of one's partner, but unwillingness to share property equitably 
if the relationship ends? Commitment, in other words, may be a bi-
nary concept, at least when intimate relationships are involved. One 
may speak of the absence or presence of commitment, but one does 
so less easily of commitment with respect to some aspects of the rela-
tionship but not others. Marriage has such cultural resonance be-
cause it is seen as involving an open-ended pledge to share the 
uncertainties of life "for better or for worse," rather than a qualified 
promise to bear some risks but not others. 
To be sure, few if any partners can live up to this ideal. The exi-
gencies of daily life and the frailties of human beings inevitably con-
strain our ability to realize it. Acknowledging that these practical 
obstacles will almost certainly arise, however, is different from specifY-
ing at the outset that there are limits on the commitment that one is 
willing to make. Marriage may be valuable as a "regulative ideal," an 
aspiration that shapes purposive activity, even if that activit}' never 
fully fu1fills the aspiration that animates it.1!!1 Will marriage continue 
to serve this function if it is one option among many on a menu of 
legally recognized intimate relationships? 
IV. SAME-SEX COUPLES 
As I noted at the outset, my discussion of the legal treatment of 
unmarried couples is based on the premise that marriage should be 
extended to same-sex couples. In the absence of this step, laws treat-
ing same-sex domestic partners similarly to spouses may be a reasona-
ble way to acknowledge both that gays and lesbians may be involved in 
committed relationships and that there is some resistance to making 
marriage available to them. It is worth noting, however, that the goal 
of preserving the distinctiveness of marriage and avoiding blurring its 
differences with unmarried intimate relationships may in fact be 
served by permitting same-sex couples to marry if they choose. 
121 See generaUy DOROTHY EMMET, THE ROLE OF THE UNREALlS.WLE: A SruD\' IN REG-
ULA.TIVE IDEALS (1994) (defending reliance on regulative ideals as a \'alliable fonn of 
moral standard). 
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First, some of the impetus for the enactment of domestic partner 
legislation has been a desire to provide at least a measure of legal 
recognition for committed same-sex relationships. 122 Some provisions 
that extend benefits to both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic part-
ners may well reflect the fear that failure to include the latter group 
may prompt a legal challenge. If marriage were available to gays and 
lesbians, some, although not all, of the pressure for domestic partner 
legislation might abate. All intimate couples who wished to make a 
significant commitment to one another would be able to marry. 
States could then reasonably assume that unmarried couples generally 
represented those partners who did not wish to make such a commit-
ment. While it would be appropriate to provide some legal benefits to 
such couples in accordance with the analytical framework that I have 
suggested, there might be less insistence on fully comparable treat-
ment of married and unmarried couples. 
A second benefit is admittedly more speculative, but perhaps 
more important. Despite elimination of most of the formal legal pro-
visions reinforcing traditional spousal gender roles, marriage as a cul-
tural symbol undeniably is still associated with the adoption of these 
roles. Surely there are some couples who are deeply committed to 
one another who nonetheless are wary of marrying, because they see it 
as entry into a patriarchal institution kept alive by social expectations. 
If same-sex couples were able to marry, however, there would be a 
body of spouses for whom gender could not serve as the basis for a 
division of labor. Marriage, in other words, would no longer be an 
exclusively gendered relationship, thereby confounding traditional 
expectations that rest on this feature. 123 This severance could well 
change the cultural meaning of marriage, investing it with a more 
egaiitarian ethos. Such a development would remove what may be an 
important obstacle to marriage by committed partners, thereby mak-
ing even more justified legal distinctions between married and up.mar-
ried couples. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that society is justified in treating marriage as a 
legally privileged intimate relationship, thereby preserving a distinc-
122 In Vennont, of course, legislation is a response to the state supreme court's 
requirement that the state find some way to make available to same-sex couples the 
marital benefits that are provided to those who marry. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 
864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
123 See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAw & SE..,{U. 
ALl'lY 9, 18-19 (1991). 
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tion bet\'veen married and unmarried couples. Due regard for practi-
ceil realities, however, supports treating marriage and cohabitation 
similarly in certain circumstances. In general, these are when an indi-
vidual is rendered vulnerable by virtue of her reliance on a nonmarital 
relationship or wishes to express his or her commitment by assuming 
responsibilities to a partner or child. If more couples cohabit, we can 
expect more cases in which the law recognizes these interests. This 
itself could begin to blur the perception that there is a meaningful 
difference between marriage and cohabitation. If marriage involves 
fewer exclusive benefits, its burdens may seem more pronounced. 
Might this malse marriage appear even less desirable than 
cohabitation? 
. One response is that, in many cases, recognizing the claim of one 
domestic partner also involves imposing a duty on the other. This is 
true, for instance, with respect to financial awards at the time an un-
married couple separates. In addition, certain rights represent the 
assumption of an obligation, such as the right to make medical or 
other decisions on behalf of an incapacitated partner. To the extent 
that rights and responsibilities are paired, the perceived distinctive 
burdens of marriage may seem less. 
Nonetheless, a second response is that it is precisely the greater 
obligations involved in marriage that give it a special status as the pre-
eminent expression of intimate commitment. A 'willingness to assume 
burdens and responsibilities that could easily be avoided can signal a 
special depth of commitment The acceptance of limits on individual 
freedom, when an alternative exists that offers many benefits "ithout 
such restrictions, could make marriage an even more powerful cul-
tural symbol. What is unclear is whether this will come at the cost of 
fewer marriages. Will marriage become a more potent, but less cho-
sen, social arrangement? 
Perhaps. To try to prevent this by resolutely refusing to provide 
any legal benefits to cohabitors, however, seems misguided. First, it 
would result in hardship in many cases. Furthermore, it is by no 
means certain that this would discourage cohabitation and encourage 
marriage. The dramatic increase in cohabitation in recent decades 
has come during a period in which legal benefits have been made 
available haltingly arid inconsistently. The social practice of cohabita-
tion seems to have placed increasing pressure on the law, rather than 
law prompting changes in behavior. 
This suggests that preserving the legal distinctiveness of marriage 
may have an ambiguous impact On the one hand, couples may be 
only vaguely familiar with the legal rights and duties that accompany 
marriage when they make decisions about their relationships. This 
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suggests that different legal treatment of marriage and cohabitation 
may have little effect on the choices of intimate partners. At the same 
time, marriage remains the most significant symbol of commitment to 
a shared intimate life between adults. As a cultural icon, it may be 
more powerful than ever. Eliminating all or most legal distinctions 
between it and cohabitation could begin to erode that symbolic role-
even though the ability to describe precisely how this might happen is 
maddeningly elusive. . 
Marriage and cohabitation ultimately should evoke considerable 
humility for those attempting to trace the intricate connections 
among law, culture, and behavior. This is an area in which grand pro· 
noun cements and categorical approaches are less useful than aware· 
ness of the limits of rationality and appreciation of "tlle crooked 
timber of humanity."124 Perhaps more than any other dimension of 
life, intimate relationships remind us that what we care about most 
may be hardest to attain by design. Yet, the very importance of those 
relationships makes it seem unthinkable not to try. In the end, we are 
left with the paradox that Karl Llewellyn described so well: "Law 
means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on tlle 
law." 125 
124 See generaUy ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANItr. CI-IAl'TE.HS IN 
THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1991) (suggesting in various essays that there is no single 
human way oflife superior to all others). 
125 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-AnEssay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704, 
751 (1931). 
